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Iraq WMDs (2003)

A war was sold on evidence that didn't exist.

In 2003, the United States and the United Kingdom invaded Iraq, claiming Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction that posed an imminent threat. Secretary of State Colin Powell presented the case to the United Nations with satellite photos, diagrams, and intelligence reports. It was convincing. It was also wrong.

No weapons of mass destruction were ever found. The Downing Street Memo, leaked in 2005, revealed that British intelligence officials believed the intelligence was being "fixed around the policy" — meaning the decision to invade came first, and the evidence was shaped to fit. Sources were unreliable. Dissenting analysts were sidelined. The famous claim that Iraq could deploy chemical weapons within 45 minutes was based on a single, unverified source.

The cost was enormous: hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians dead, thousands of coalition soldiers killed, a region destabilised for decades, and trillions of dollars spent. Yet almost nobody in power faced consequences. The intelligence agencies blamed bad sources. The politicians blamed the intelligence agencies. The media, which largely amplified the claims without scrutiny, moved on.

Iraq should have changed how you consume official justifications for anything. When powerful institutions agree on a story and rush you toward a conclusion, that's exactly when you should slow down.

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